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Abstract
I provide a full characterization of the set of absolutely expedient learning rules
introduced in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) [“Expedient and monotone learning
rules,” Econometrica, 72, 383–405]. The expected change in the expected payoff can be
written as a quadratic form on the vector of relative expected payoffs of the strategies.
This permits use of standard linear algebra arguments to provide a characterization in
terms of the matrix defining this quadratic form.
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1 Introduction
Consider a decision maker who chooses within a finite set of strategies according to a given
initial probability distribution. After choosing one of these strategies and observing the
payoff it yields, she revises the probability of choosing each strategy. Learning models of
this nature have been broadly studied, both theoretically and in experiments, to understand
how individuals reach observed decisions; see e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (2009). Learning
models studied in the literature are predominantly non-Bayesian and, as such, the class of
them that can be devised is large and loose. Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004), henceforth
BMS (2004), provide a first attempt at studying desirable properties, or axioms, for learning
rules. Their first property is absolute expediency, which requires the performance of decisions,
in terms of expected payoffs, to improve over time. Formally, a learning rule is absolutely
expedient if the expected payoff, computed with the expected value of the revised probability
of choosing each strategy, is greater than the expected payoff with the previous probabilities.
Since this appealing property tries to set up a criterion to assess the plausibility of learning
rules, obtaining a complete characterization is fundamental. The main results in BMS (2004)
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give necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for absolute expediency, but they do not
obtain a full characterization. This note closes this gap by providing a necessary and sufficient
condition.
BMS (2004) provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for absolute expedi-
ency in terms of how the obtained payoff determines the revised probability of choosing each
strategy. The necessary condition they find is that absolutely expedient learning rules exhibit
positive own-effects, i.e., the revised probability of choosing the strategy chosen in a given
period is an increasing function of the payoff this strategy yielded.1) Their sufficient condi-
tion is that cross-effects are negative, i.e., the revised probability of choosing each unchosen
strategy is decreasing in the payoff obtained by the chosen strategy.2) They leave open, how-
ever, the question of which learning rules satisfying their necessary conditions but not their
sufficient conditions are absolutely expedient. That is, their results are silent about the ab-
solute expediency of learning rules exhibiting built-in similarity, i.e., the revised probability
of choosing some non chosen strategies is an increasing function of the payoff yielded by the
chosen strategy. They provide examples of learning rules exhibiting built-in similarity and,
using direct computations of the expected change in the expected payoff, show that some
are absolutely expedient while some are not. This note’s main result provides a necessary
and sufficient condition on the magnitudes of own-effects and cross-effects for a learning rule
to be absolutely expedient. This characterization reveals that absolute expediency requires
expected own-effects (i.e., own-effects weighted by the probability of choosing the correspond-
ing strategy) to be relatively large compared to the magnitude of expected cross-effects (i.e.,
cross-effects weighted by the probability of choosing the corresponding strategy).
To see the intuition of this condition, consider any given strategy. We know that all
absolutely expedient learning rules have positive own-effects. This is somewhat intuitive:
the higher the payoff yielded by this strategy, the greater the revised probability of choosing
it, which has a positive impact on the expected change in the expected payoff. However, the
expected change in the probability of choosing this strategy is also determined by cross-effects
that are unrelated to its expected payoff and therefore, might have a negative impact on the
expected change in the expected payoff. The conditions imposed by the characterization,
that the expected own-effects are relatively large compared to the expected cross-effects,
guarantee that the overall impact of the own-effects on the expected change in the expected
payoff dominates the overall impact of the cross-effects.
2 Framework
This section describes this note’s framework, which is the same as in BMS (2004).
Environment. A finite set of pure strategies, S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} with n ≥ 2, is available
to the decision maker. If chosen, strategy si yields a random payoff, with realization x ∈ [0, 1],
1)All these learning rules also satisfy the unbiasedness property. This property was introduced in BMS
(2004) and is defined formally below.
2)To be precise, it is also required that every non-empty, strict subset of the set of strategies contains
at least one strategy whose revised probability is strictly decreasing in the obtained payoff of at least one
strategy that is not in that set. For details, see the Appendix.
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according to the distribution µi. A collection (µi)i=1,...,n of such payoff distributions is called
an environment. The expected payoff of strategy si is denoted by pii :=
´
xdµi ∈ [0, 1] for i =
1, ..., n and we define pi := (pii)i=1,...,n. The analysis is concerned with decisions in two periods.
The decision maker’s choice in the first period is determined according to an exogenously
given vector of probabilities of choosing each strategy, denoted by σ = (σi)i=1,...,n, with
σi ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, ..., n and
∑n
i=1 σi = 1. We assume that the environment is the same in
both periods and that the payoff yielded by each strategy in the first period is independent
of the payoff yielded by each strategy in the second period.
Learning rules. The decision maker does not know the environment, but she observes
the payoff she receives after choosing her strategy in the first period. Her choice in the second
period is described by the revised probability of choosing each pure strategy. We define a
function called the learning rule, denoted by L : S × [0, 1]→ ∆(S). This function maps the
strategy chosen in the first period and the obtained payoff to the vector of probabilities of
choosing each strategy in the second period. In particular, L(sj, x)(si) denotes the probabil-
ity of choosing strategy si in the second period, given that strategy sj is chosen in the first
period and the payoff x is obtained. Conditional on the event that strategy sj is chosen in
the first period, the expected revised probability of choosing strategy si is
´
L(sj, x)(si)dµj,
for all si, sj ∈ S.
The properties analyzed here are concerned with the expected change in the probability
of choosing each strategy. This expected change is given by
f(si) :=
n∑
j=1
σj
ˆ
L(sj, x)(si)dµj − σi (1)
for i = 1, ..., n. Similarly we can compute the expected change in the expected payoff of the
decision maker, denoted by g, as
g =
n∑
i=1
f(si)pii. (2)
As we shall see below, for all the learning rules that we are interested in, the revised proba-
bility of choosing each strategy is a linear function of the obtained payoff and f(si) is a linear
transformation of pi for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. This yields that g is a quadratic transformation of
pi.
Absolutely Expedient learning rules. Our analysis is concerned with absolutely
expedient rules, i.e., learning rules for which, given the probabilities of choosing each strategy
in the first period, the decision maker’s expected payoff in the second period is greater than
her first-period expected payoff.
Definition 1 A learning rule L is absolutely expedient if g > 0 in all environments such
that pii '= pij for some si, sj ∈ S.
The next section provides the background for the analysis of g using quadratic forms.
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3 Unbiasedness and quadratic forms
Lemma 1 in BMS (2004) shows that all absolutely expedient learning rules satisfy the unbi-
asedness property.
Definition 2 A learning rule L is unbiased if f(si) = 0 for all si ∈ S in all environment
such that pii = pij for all si, sj ∈ S.
In other words, unbiasedness imposes that the expected change in the probability of
choosing each strategy is zero in every environment such that all strategies have the same
expected payoff. BMS (2004) provide a characterization of unbiased learning rules. A learn-
ing rule L is unbiased if and only if 3) there exist matrices (Aij)i,j=1,2,...,n and (Bij)i,j=1,2,...,n
such that for all si ∈ S and x ∈ [0, 1],
L(si, x)(si) = σi + (1− σi)(Aii + Biix), (3)
L(sj, x)(si) = σi − σi(Aji + Bjix), (4)
for all sj ∈ S \ {si}, and 4)
Aii =
n∑
j=1
σjAji (5)
Bii =
n∑
j=1
σjBji. (6)
Coefficients (Bij)i,j=1,2,...,n play an important role in the sequel.
5) In particular, (1−σi)Bii
is the derivative of the increase in the probability of choosing strategy si with respect to
the obtained payoff, when this strategy is chosen. That is, for a given σ, Bii determines
the impact of the obtained payoff on ‘reinforcing’ the choice of strategy si. Similarly, σiBji
is the derivative of the decrease in the probability of choosing strategy si with respect to
the obtained payoff, when strategy sj (with j '= i) is chosen. That is, for a given σ, Bji
determines the impact of the obtained payoff on ‘deterring’ the choice of strategy si when sj
is chosen. We allow for the possibility that Bji < 0, i.e., the higher the payoff obtained with
strategy sj, the more likely that strategy si is chosen in the next period. If this is the case,
then we say that the learning rule exhibits built-in similarity between strategies si and sj.
3)Oyarzun and Sarin (2013) provide an alternative characterization of unbiased learning rules. Their
approach considers stochastic dominance criteria instead of expected values and they show that a learning
rule is unbiased if and only if it satisfies a property related to risk-neutral learning.
4)Since revised probabilities of choosing each strategy sum to one, conditions (3) and (4) imply Aii =∑n
j=1 σjAij and Bii =
∑n
j=1 σjBij for i = 1, ..., n.
5)In contrast, condition (5) imply that the coefficients Aij for i, j = 1, 2, ..., n cancel out in the computation
of the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy and hence are irrelevant for the subsequent
analysis.
If L is unbiased, plugging equations (3)-(6) in (1), and (1) in (2), the expected change in
the expected payoff can be written as
g =
n∑
i=1
σipii
(
(1− σi)Biipii −
n∑
j=1,j !=i
(σjBijpij)
)
. (7)
As we shall see below, this expression provides the key for the characterization of absolutely
expedient learning rules.
Matrix-based approach. Expression (7) allows us to write the expected change in
the expected payoff as a quadratic transformation of the vector of expected payoffs of the
strategies. In particular, if L is unbiased, then there exists a matrix Q ≡ (qij)i,j∈{1,...,n} such
that for all pi ∈ [0, 1]n,
g = pi′Qpi,
with
Q :=

σ1(1− σ1)B11 −σ1σ2B12 · · · −σ1σnB1n
−σ2σ1B21 σ2(1− σ2)B22 · · · −σ2σnB2n
...
... . . .
...
−σnσ1Bn1 −σnσ2Bn2 · · · σn(1− σn)Bnn
 .
The ith-diagonal term of Q, σi(1 − σi)Bii, is the expected own-effect of strategy si, i.e.,
the probability of choosing strategy si times the marginal effect of the obtained payoff on
the revised probability of choosing strategy si, when this strategy is chosen. The ijth-off-
diagonal term of Q, −σiσjBij, is the expected cross-effect of strategy si on strategy sj, i.e.,
the probability of choosing strategy si times the marginal effect of the obtained payoff on
the revised probability of choosing strategy sj, when si is chosen.
The first product in the quadratic form, pi′Q, provides a row-vector whose ith-element
is f(si), the expected change in the probability of choosing strategy si. Taking the inner
product between this row-vector and pi, we obtain g, the expected change in the expected
payoff. Therefore, absolute expediency requires the vector of the expected changes in the
probability of choosing each strategy and the vector of expected payoffs to be similar, in the
sense that they have to be in the same half-space so that their inner product is positive.
The characterization provided in the next section shows that a learning rule is absolutely
expedient if and only if all sub-matrixes of Q, obtained by deleting the row and column
corresponding to any strategy, are positive definite.
4 Characterization of absolute expediency
Let Q−k := (qij)i,j∈{1,...,n}\{k}, for k = 1, ..., n. The following result characterizes absolute
expediency.
Proposition 1 A learning rule L is absolutely expedient if and only if it is unbiased and
Q−k is positive definite for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
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The conditions on Q of this characterization translate into several restrictions, in terms
of the expected own- and cross-effects (determined by σ and the coefficients (Bij)i,j=1,2,...,n),
whose intuition is discussed in detail in the next section. This characterization also provides a
direct test for absolute expediency. We just need to compute the matrices Q−k for k = 1, ..., n
and verify that they are positive definite. As we shall see below, however, assessing the
positive definiteness of only one of these matrices is sufficient.
The intuition of the proof of this proposition is as follows. As the argument reveals, for
any strategy sk and environment such that pik ∈ (0, 1), we can write g as a function of the
‘relative’ expected payoffs (pii − pik)i!=k. This function has a critical point where all expected
payoffs are the same and, by definition, this function equals zero at this point. The proof
also reveals that this function’s Hessian matrix is Q−k+Q′−k. Therefore, we need Q−k+Q′−k
to be positive definite to guarantee that the critical point is a strict minimizer, and g > 0
when not all expected payoffs are the same. Since
z′Q−kz = z′
(
1
2
(
Q−k +Q′−k
))
z, (8)
for all z ∈ Rn−1, Q−k+Q′−k is positive definite if and only if Q−k is positive definite, and this
yields the result. The fact that Q−k and its symmetric part, 12
(
Q−k +Q′−k
)
, yield the same
quadratic form is used often in the sequel, because several results useful for our analysis are
available only for symmetric matrixes. Note that we do not assume Bij = Bji for any i '= j.
Next is the formal proof.
Proof. Necessity. BMS (2004) show that every absolutely expedient learning rule is unbi-
ased, so we consider an unbiased learning rule L and show that it needs to satisfy that Q−k
is positive definite for k = 1, ..., n to be absolutely expedient. Fix k ∈ {1, ..., n}, consider
an environment with pik ∈ (0, 1), and define t := (ti)i∈{1,...,n}\{k}, with ti := pii − pik for
i ∈ {1, ..., n}. The expression for g in (2) is unchanged if we replace the expected payoffs,
pii, with the relative expected payoffs, ti, for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Since tk = 0, we obtain
g = t′Q−kt. (9)
Define ϕ : Rn−1 → R, with ϕ(z) = z′Q−kz for all z ∈ Rn−1, and observe that
g = ϕ(t). (10)
If all strategies have the same expected payoff, then t = t∗ := 0(n−1)×1, g = 0, and (10)
implies ϕ(t∗) = 0. Furthermore, t∗ is a critical point of ϕ because the gradient of ϕ, denoted
by ∇ϕ, is given by
∇ϕ(z) = (Q−k +Q′−k) z,
for all z ∈ Rn−1. Since we consider an environment such that pik ∈ (0, 1), absolute expediency
requires ϕ(t∗) = 0 to be a strict local minimum of ϕ. Therefore, the Hessian of ϕ, given by
Q−k +Q′−k, must be positive definite and hence, Q−k must also be positive definite.
Sufficiency. As above, consider an unbiased learning rule L, fix k ∈ {1, ..., n}, and
suppose Q−k is positive definite. Then, with t as defined above, we obtain g = t′Q−kt. If
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pii '= pij for some strategies si, sj ∈ S, then t '= 0(n−1)×1 and the positive definiteness of Q−k
yields g > 0.6)
Two observations follow immediately from the proof. First, the argument for necessity
shows that, if the learning rule L is absolutely expedient, Q−k must be positive definite for
all k ∈ {1, ..., n}. On the other hand, from the proof for sufficiency, we have that, if Q−k
is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then L is absolutely expedient. This reveals
that if Q−k is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then Q−k is positive definite for all
k ∈ {1, ..., n}. Therefore, checking the positive definiteness of Q−k for only one strategy sk
is enough to assess whether a learning rule is absolutely expedient.
Second, BMS (2004) call learning rules such that Bii is strictly positive for i = 1, ..., n,
own-positive, and show that all absolutely expedient learning rules satisfy this property.
Here, we observe that the positive definiteness of Q−k implies that all its diagonal elements
are strictly positive. Thus, if Q−k is positive definite for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then Bii is strictly
positive for i = 1, ..., n. Therefore, our characterization provides an alternate proof of the
necessity of own-positiveness for absolutely expediency. These two observations are collected
in the following remark.
Remark 1 If L is unbiased and Q−k is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then: (i)
Q−i is positive definite for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and (ii) L is own-positive.7)
A first application of Proposition 1 provides a simple proof of essentially the same state-
ment as part (ii) of Proposition 3 in BMS (2004). In particular, if a learning rule is unbiased
and its cross-effects are strictly negative, then it is absolutely expedient.
Corollary 1 If L is unbiased and Bij > 0 for all i, j = 1, ..., n, then L is absolutely expedient.
Proof. For any k ∈ {1, ..., n}, (6) and the hypothesis imply Bii >
∑n
j=1,j !=k σjBji, and the
fact that revised probabilities sum to one imply Bii >
∑n
j=1j !=k σjBij. This yields that the
symmetric matrix Q−k + Q′−k is strictly diagonally dominant and, hence, positive definite
for k = 1, ..., n.8) Thus, Proposition 1 implies that L is absolutely expedient.
The counterpart of this result in BMS (2004) is slightly stronger, as they allow some
coefficients Bij to be zero. The peculiar nature of their result makes it difficult to fully
derive it directly from standard linear algebra results such as those used in the proof of
Corollary 1. Yet, as shown in the Appendix, the matrix-based approach provides a shortcut
to derive their result completely. The characterization in Proposition 1, however, also allows
for some of the coefficients Bij to be negative, as the example in the next section illustrates.
6)An earlier version of this note worked with a construction using the relative expected payoffs, pii/pik,
instead of pii − pik. Keiichi Kawai suggested the simple construction provided here.
7)From the first observation in Remark 1, Proposition 1 can be written as the equivalence between (i)
a learning rule is absolutely expedient, (ii) a learning rule is unbiased and Q−k is positive definite for all
k ∈ {1, ..., n}, and (iii) a learning rule is unbiased and Q−k is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}. The
necessity part in the proof of Proposition 1 shows that (i) implies (ii), it is immediate that (ii) implies (iii),
and the sufficiency part in the proof of Proposition 1 shows that (iii) implies (i).
8)See, e.g., Quarteroni, Sacco, and Saleri (2007).
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5 Expected own- and cross-effects’ magnitudes
Conditions on expected own- and cross-effects. This section discusses the restric-
tions imposed by absolute expediency, expressed directly in terms of σ and the coefficients
(Bij)i,j=1,2,...,n of the representation in equations (3)-(6). Now, we show that the positive
definiteness of Q−n requires the expected own-effects to be positive and relatively large with
respect to the magnitude of the expected cross-effects. The positive definiteness of Q−n
can be assessed using Sylvester’s criterion (see, e.g., Gilbert 1991): all principal minors
of 12
(
Q−n +Q′−n
)
must be strictly positive. When there are only three strategies, direct
computations yield the following observation.
Remark 2 For n = 3, an unbiased learning rule (represented using equations (3)-(4)) is
absolutely expedient if and only if
σ1(1− σ1)B11 > 0 (11)
and
σ2(1− σ2)B22 > 1
σ1(1− σ1)B11
(
σ1σ2B12 + σ2σ1B21
2
)2
. (12)
For n > 3, in the same manner as in Remark 2 and using Laplace expansion to compute
higher-order principal minors, we obtain that, in general, the principal minors of Q−n are
strictly positive if the expected own-effects are large enough compared to the magnitude of
the expected cross-effects.9)
Intuition. Recall that (2) may be re-written as
g =
n−1∑
i=1
f(si)ti = t ·Q−nt, (13)
with t = (ti)n−1i=1 , where ti = pii − pin is the relative expected payoff of strategy si for
i = 1, ..., n − 1. For simplicity, consider an environment where all strategies have differ-
ent expected payoffs and pin =
∑n
i=1 σipii, so the expected payoff of strategies with a positive
(negative) relative expected payoff is greater (smaller) than the first-period expected payoff∑n
i=1 σipii.10) If the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy si is posi-
tive (negative) when its relative expected payoff ti is positive (negative), then we would have
f(si)ti > 0, which would have a positive impact on the expected change in the expected
payoff, yielding g > 0 in (13). This would be the case if Q−n were a diagonal matrix: since
9)The sign of the sum of the expected cross-terms, σ1σ2B12 + σ2σ1B21, plays no direct role in these
conditions. It is the absolute value of this sum that needs to be relatively small compared to the expected
own-effects. These conditions are automatically satisfied when Bij > 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} \ {i} and
i ∈ {1, ..., n}, as implied by the argument in the proof of Corollary 1. When some of these coefficients are
negative, however, condition (12) may be binding, as the example below illustrates.
10)The argument in the subsequent discussion follows in general, defining the relative expected payoffs with
respect to any of the strategies with the highest expected payoff that is less than or equal to
∑n
i=1 σipii. The
assumption that all expected payoffs are different just rules out trivial cases.
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the expected own-effects σi(1−σi)Bii are strictly positive for i = 1, ..., n, and t ·Q−n provides
a row-vector with ith-element f(si), f(si) and ti would have the same sign, and this would
yield g > 0. In other words, if a learning rule is own-positive and the expected change in the
probability of choosing each strategy were determined only by its own-effect –the only effect
based on information on the expected payoff of each strategy– then the learning rule would
be absolutely expedient. Q−n is, however, typically non-diagonal, because some cross-effects
are different from zero. Therefore, the expected change in the probability of choosing each
strategy is not only determined by its own-effect, but also by cross-effects not dependent
upon the expected payoff of that strategy and that therefore might have a negative impact
on the expected change in the expected payoff. The large magnitude of expected own-effects
imposed by Proposition 1, however, guarantees that expected own-effects dominate expected
cross-effects and, hence, yield g > 0.11) We illustrate this intuition in the analysis of the
following example.
Example. Consider an unbiased learning rule L with three strategies that satisfies (3)-
(6) for some matrices (Aij)i,j=1,2,3 and (Bij)i,j=1,2,3.
12) Examples with more strategies can
be handled in the same way. The learning rule analyzed here is a generalized version of
Example 2 in BMS (2004). It allows for built-in similarity, i.e., there are two strategies, s1
and s2, such that the revised probability of choosing one strategy is increasing in the payoff
yielded by the other. In particular,
L(si, x)(si) = σi + (1− σi)kx
L(si, x)(sj) = σj + (1− σj)lx,
for i, j = 1, 2, with j '= i; where k and l are strictly positive real numbers that may depend
on σ, so that all revised probabilities are contained in [0, 1]. The representation of this
learning rule using equations (3)-(4) yields Aij = 0 for i, j = 1, 2, B11 = B22 = k, and the
cross-coefficients between strategies s1 and s2,
B12 = −1− σ2
σ2
l
B21 = −1− σ1
σ1
l.
This defines completely the learning rule because all other parts of L can be obtained using
equations (5) and (6), and the fact that
∑n
j=1 L(si, x)(sj) = 1 for all si ∈ S and x ∈ [0, 1].
11)This argument also explains why inequality (12) in Remark 2 depends only on the magnitude, and not
on the sign of the sum of the cross-terms, σ1σ2B12 + σ2σ1B21, (see footnote 9)): in principle we could
have negative cross-effects (Bij > 0) that are too large and take too much probability away from a strategy
with a very high expected payoff when other strategy with a relatively high expected payoff is chosen; or,
analogously, we could have positive cross-effects (Bij < 0) that are too large and add too much probability
to a strategy with a low expected payoff when other strategy with a relatively high expected payoff is chosen.
As Corollary 1 reveals, however, unbiasedness prevents the magnitudes of the coefficients Bij from yielding
the first of these possibilities (when all cross-effects are negative).
12)In problems with two strategies, absolute expediency is equivalent to the property of monotonicity, fully
characterized in BMS (2004). For a brief discussion of monotone learning rules, see the Appendix.
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The first principal minor of (Q−3+Q′−3)/2 is σ1(1−σ1)k > 0. Straightforward computa-
tions reveal that the second principal minor of (Q−3 +Q′−3)/2 is strictly positive if and only
if
4σ1(1− σ1)σ2(1− σ2)k2 > (σ1 (1− σ2) + σ2 (1− σ1))2 l2. (14)
Condition (14) reveals the required magnitude of the expected own-effects for L to be ab-
solutely expedient. To illustrate how absolute expediency may fail if (14) is not satisfied,
consider the probabilities of choosing each strategy given by σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = 1/3. For this
vector σ, condition (14) is equivalent to k > l. Suppose instead k = 1/10 and l = 1/5, and
consider any environment such that pi1 = 1, pi2 = 0 and pi3 = 1/2. In such an environment,
the relative expected payoffs of strategies s1 and s2, with respect to strategy s3, are t1 = 1/2
and t2 = −1/2. Since g = f(s1)t1 + f(s2)t2 = 1/2(f(s1)− f(s2)), we need f(s1) > f(s2) for
g to be strictly positive. Yet, computing (t1, t2)′Q−3 yields f(s1) = −1/90 and f(s2) = 1/90.
Intuitively, since the own-effects are relatively small compared to the cross-effects between
strategies s1 and s2, the relatively high payoff of strategy s1 increases more the probabil-
ity of choosing strategy s2 in the second period than the probability of choosing s1, even
though pi2 = 0, ultimately yielding g < 0. This possibility would be ruled out if Bij > 0
for all si, sj ∈ S (no built-in similarity), or if B12 < 0 and B21 < 0, but with relatively
small magnitudes compared to B11 and B22, as prescribed by condition (14) (mild built-in
similarity).
Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2001) derive condition (14) for absolute expediency using
longer computations showing that the minimum of g as a function of pi1, pi2, and pi3 is zero
and is achieved only when pi1 = pi2 = pi3. Therefore, this example illustrates the compu-
tational advantages of the characterization in Proposition 1 to assess absolute expediency:
we need not compute g in any environment, it is sufficient to check that the coefficients
(Bij)i,j=1,...,n and σ yield a matrix Q−k satisfying Sylvester’s criterion. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, this characterization provides a method to assess this property that can always be
directly applied.
6 Conclusion
The expected change in the expected payoff of unbiased learning rules can be written as
a quadratic form on the vector of expected payoffs of each strategy. This representation
allows us to characterize absolutely expedient learning rules as those whose corresponding
quadratic form matrix has a positive definite upper-left corner (n− 1)× (n− 1) sub-matrix.
This implies that absolute expediency requires the expected own-effects to be relatively large
compared to the magnitude of expected crossed-effects. This characterization permits use of
experimental data to assess the relevance of this property in the analysis of human behavior.
In particular, one could test whether the own-effects of an individual’s learning rule are as
large as absolute expediency requires. This is an interesting subject for future research.
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7 Appendix
BMS (2004) also introduce a property called monotonicity. A learning rule is monotone if
the sum of the expected changes in the probability of choosing the strategies with the highest
expected payoff is strictly positive. Let S∗ = {si ∈ S : pii ≥ pij ∀sj ∈ S}; formally, a learning
rule is monotone if
∑
si∈S∗ f(si) > 0 whenever pii '= pij for some si, sj ∈ S. BMS (2004) show
that a learning rule is monotone if and only if it is unbiased, Bij ≥ 0 for all si, sj ∈ S; and
for all non-empty strict-subset C of S there are strategies si ∈ C and sj ∈ S \ C such that
Bij > 0.
It is a straightforward corollary from Proposition 3 of BMS (2004) that all monotone
rules are absolutely expedient. This Appendix provides a short alternate proof of this fact
that relies on the techniques developed in this note.
Proposition 2 Every monotone learning rule is absolutely expedient.
Proof. Since g = pi′
(
1
2 (Q+Q
′)
)
pi, g can be written as g =
∑n
i=1 f˜(si)pii, where f˜(si) :=
pi′ (q˜ji)j=1,...,n for i = 1, ..., n, with (q˜ji)i,j=1,...,n :=
(
1
2 (Q+Q
′)
)
. Observe that q˜ii := σi(1 −
σi)Bii and
q˜ij = q˜ji := −σiσj (Bij + Bji)
2
for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and j ∈ {1, ..., n} \ {i}. Thus,
f˜(si) = q˜iipii +
n∑
j=1,j !=i
q˜jipij = σi(1− σi)Biipii −
n∑
j=1,j !=i
σiσj (Bij + Bji)
2
pij.
Since (1− σi)Bii =
∑n
j=1,j !=i σjBij =
∑n
j=1,j !=i σjBji, we obtain
f˜(si) = σi
n∑
j=1,j !=i
σj (Bij + Bji)
2
(pii − pij) = −σi
n∑
j=1,j !=i
σj q˜ij (pii − pij) .
Thus, g = −∑ni=1∑nj=1,j !=i σiσj q˜ij (pii − pij) pii. Therefore,
g = −
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
σiσj q˜ij (pii − pij)2 .
Since q˜ij ≤ 0 for all i '= j with strict inequality at least for some si ∈ S∗ and sj ∈ S \ S∗, we
conclude that g > 0.
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